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This paper experimentally investigates whether risk-averse 
individuals punish less if the outcome of punishment is uncertain than 
when it is certain. Our design includes three treatments: Baseline in 
which the one-shot prisoner’s dilemma game is played; Certain 
Punishment in which the prisoner’s dilemma game is followed by a 
punishment stage allowing subjects to decrease the other player’s payoff 
by 2 Euros; and Uncertain Punishment in which subjects could decrease 
the other player’s payoff with a 50% probability by 1 Euro and with a 
50% probability by 3 Euros. We find that in all cases the risk-averse 
subjects are equally likely to cooperate in the prisoner’s dilemma and 
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Imagine two researchers working on a joint project. Both can work hard or free-ride on 
the work of the other researcher. For a certain set of outcomes, this situation resembles a 
prisoner’s dilemma. The researcher’s action will eventually be revealed to his co-author, who 
will then have the opportunity to punish him for slacking off. What could a punishment look 
like? For example, it could take the form of sharing the bad experience with other colleagues 
in the profession. However, it is unclear what effect the punishment will have on the flaky 
researcher. On one hand, it might affect a tenure decision or hiring in a close race for a job or 
perhaps discourage other colleagues to work with the person in the future. On the other hand, 
the punishment might be meaningless if other factors already determined the outcome and/or 
when other colleagues disregard the information about the flaky researcher’s input into the 
project. 
Because the co-author who punishes does not necessarily know the flaky researcher’s 
situation, she cannot fully assess the impact of the punishment. Thus, the decision to punish 
could be viewed as having an uncertain outcome. In fact, there are many real life situations 
where the punishment might not get through at all and thus be insignificant to the recipient.
1 It 
is thus natural to ask whether uncertainty associated with the punishment outcome is an 
important determinant of the punishment decision and whether the punisher’s risk attitude 
sheds any light on her behavior. Understanding the role of risk attitude might turn out to be 
socially beneficial as it is likely to affect individuals’ willingness to cooperate (Becker 
(1968)) and potentially also punish (in particular in situations where punishment can lead to 
retaliation and escalation of conflict). 
Distributional models of other-regarding preferences (e.g., Fehr and Schmidt (1999), 
Bolton and Ockenfels (2000), Charness and Rabin (2002)) which are often used to explain the 
punishing behavior noted elsewhere in the literature, do not consider uncertainty of outcomes. 
On their own such models cannot provide guidance on whether we should observe more or 
less punishment in situations when its outcome is uncertain. Moreover, in the above example 
the uncertainty pertains to the flaky researcher but does not directly affect the (monetary) 
payoff of the decision maker. Thus, none of existing expected utility theories can be directly 
applied without making an additional assumption on how uncertainty affects preferences over 
the payoffs of the other person. 
                                                 
1 Sometimes punishment might also target a wrong person.  
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In this paper we study how uncertainty of punishment outcomes interacts with a decision 
to cooperate and also with a decision to decrease the other person’s monetary payoff in a 
punishment stage. In our analysis we assume that a decision maker’s risk attitude also 
determines preferences over expected payoffs of other people in the same manner as it 
determines preferences over her own expected payoff. We present an experiment in which 
subjects have an opportunity to punish their counterpart, but the outcome of punishment 
depends on the realization of a random variable. The subjects’ decisions are compared to 
those in another treatment in which the outcome of punishment is certain. We have embedded 
our explorations in a prisoner’s dilemma game in which the players decide whether to defect 
and maximize their own monetary payoffs or to cooperate and maximize the joint surplus. 
Social dilemma situations have been extensively studied in the economics literature for a 
long time (see Roth (1988) for an overview). Fehr and Gächter (2000a) show that incentives 
to free-ride in a voluntary contribution mechanism (VCM) experiment can be counteracted by 
introducing a second stage which allows for punishment. Despite the punishment being 
costly, many subjects use that opportunity to deter defection. Initially, the effect on 
cooperation is small, but the contributions to a public project increase over time in a repeated 
game. A considerable amount of literature follows this paper and extends the result to non-
pecuniary sanctions (Masclet, et al. (2003); Noussair and Tucker (2005)) and explores the 
effectiveness of punishment (Nikiforakis and Normann (2008)) as well as the price of 
punishment (Anderson and Putterman (2006), Carpenter (2007)).  
In these experiments (and all other experiments on social dilemmas which we are aware 
of) the outcome of the punishment stage is certain.
2 The literature on contract enforcement 
which explores whether an agent will exert effort or shirk when faced with some probability 
of being monitored is of little help as the underlying game has a sequential rather than 
simultaneous structure and the experimental investigations (e.g., Fehr and Gächter (2000b), 
Fehr and List (2004)) focus on the effect of punishment on cooperation but not on the 
decision whether to punish or not and neither on its determinants. 
Experimental subjects are, in general, not risk-neutral (e.g., Harrison (1986), Cox, et al. 
(1988), Holt and Laury (2002), Eckel and Grossman (2008)). If subjects’ risk attitudes 
interact with their other-regarding preferences then a different risk structure present in the 
laboratory experiments on punishment in social dilemmas could potentially lead to outcomes 
                                                 
2 Experiments which allow for counter-punishment (e.g., Denant-Boemont, et al. (2007), Nikiforakis (2008), 
Engelmann and Nikiforakis (2008)) are an exception, because the recipient of punishment can reciprocate. Thus, 
because of the strategic uncertainty stemming from unknown moves of other players, it is not obvious what the 
outcome of the original punishment will be.  
 
4
which are different from behavior in the outside-the-lab world.
 3 Our study addresses the issue 
for a simple case of one-shot interaction as we feel that the simplicity of the environment is a 
virtue in exploratory projects such as this one.  
Despite a large body of experimental literature on cooperation in the prisoner’s dilemma 
game, we are not aware of any studies exploring the effect of punishment other than ceasing 
cooperation if the interaction is repeated. Although the prisoner’s dilemma game incorporates 
motivations present also in the VCM (which is sometimes called the n-person prisoner’s 
dilemma) it is not obvious whether (the possibility of) punishment increases cooperation as 
observed in VCM experiments. We examine this question by including a prisoner’s dilemma 
game without punishment in our design.
4 
We elicit subjects’ risk attitude at an individual level to test whether it explains the 
behavior in the prisoner’s dilemma game and the punishment decisions across our treatments. 
We find that risk-averse subjects are equally likely to cooperate in all treatments. Moreover, 
we find no link between risk-aversion and the decision to punish when the outcome of 
punishment is certain or uncertain. 
Next we present the experimental setup and our results, followed by a short discussion. 
Instructions can be found in the appendix. 
 
 
2. Experimental Setup 
The experiment consists of three treatments: Baseline (base in figures), Certain 
Punishment (cp), and Uncertain Punishment (ucp) implemented in an across subjects design. 
In each treatment a prisoner’s dilemma game is played. The game payoffs (presented in Table 
1) are denoted in Euros. The row player chooses Top (cooperation) or Bottom (defection), 
while the column player chooses Left (cooperation) or Right (defection).  
In the punishment stage of Certain Punishment and Uncertain Punishment treatments, 
after being notified of the result of the prisoner’s dilemma game, subjects could engage in 
                                                 
3 Of course, laboratory experiments are, by construction, simplifications of the outside-the-lab world. However, 
it is important to keep in mind these differences and whenever possible test their influence, because despite 
being simplifications, laboratory experiments are often (directly or indirectly) used to draw inferences towards 
outside-the-lab behavior. 
4 Gangadharan and Nikiforakis (2009) study bridges the literature between a repeated prisoner’s dilemma game 
and VCM. They find that subjects behave more cooperatively in the prisoner’s dilemma than in the VCM if they 
are in a group of four players but do not find a difference if the two games are played in pairs.  
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costly punishment of their partner; in Baseline there was no punishment stage. All 
information was common knowledge. 
 






In the punishment stage of the Certain Punishment treatment subjects could decrease 
their counterpart’s payoff by 2 Euros with certainty at the cost of 1 Euro to themselves. In the 
Uncertain Punishment treatment subjects could decrease the other player’s payoff with 50% 
probability by 1 Euro and with 50% probability by 3 Euros at the cost of 1 Euro to 
themselves. Thus while the expected punishment was the same in both cases (2 Euros), its 
outcome depended on the state of the world in the Uncertain Punishment treatment. The 
subjects were instructed that a coin would be flipped in front of them to determine the 
punishment outcome. If the coin toss lands on heads, the other player’s payoff is decreased by 
1 Euro. If the coins toss lands on tails, the other player’s payoff is decreased by 3 Euros. If the 
subject decided to punish, the costs of punishment were incurred irrespective of the outcome 
of the probability draw.
5 
In our experiment the subjects played the game only once as a repeated environment 
would allow them to construct portfolios of choices and render answering our research 
question impossible.
6 It should be noted that most of the experimental designs on punishment 
allow for repeated interaction. The decision to punish could be explained as an attempt to 
induce cooperation in the future. However, Fehr and Gächter (2000a) and other studies, 
provide evidence that subjects punish in the last round and that they punish in a stranger 
matching when there is no chance of encountering the same subject(s) more than once. Thus, 
we anticipated observing a relatively large proportion of punishing subjects even in the one-
shot scenario.  
                                                 
5 We decided to design the uncertain outcome in such a way that the punished person always learns that he or she 
is being punished. It is possible that subjects’ behavior would differ if there was a chance that the punished 
person does not learn about the punishment. However, this was not the focus of our study and we leave it for 
future explorations. 
6 A random rematching after every period could potentially solve the problem. However, we are interested in 
creating a simple environment where we could study the effects of uncertain outcomes of punishment without 
having to consider other confounding factors such as being punished by someone else in previous rounds. 
 Left  Right 
Top  5,5  0,8 
Bottom  8,0 2,2  
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The expected effectiveness of punishment (2:1) in our experiment is lower than usually 
observed in the literature and the expected costs (1 Euro) are relatively high. These two 
design parameters were driven primarily by the consideration of not allowing subjects to 
make losses as this was the policy of the laboratory where the experiment was run. An 
alternative way of avoiding the subjects making losses was to significantly increase the show 
up fees. However, this could potentially cause the subjects to perceive the game payoffs as 
relatively small and alter their behavior. In order to get an estimate whether the cost of 
punishment or the fear of “over-punishment” deterred some of our subjects from punishing, 
we included a couple of questions pertaining to the demand for punishment in a non-paid 
questionnaire administered at the end of the experiment. 
To measure risk attitudes of subjects we used the method developed by Holt and Laury 
(2002). That is, subjects were repeatedly offered a choice between two lotteries, one involving 
higher risk than the other. From subjects’ choices between ten lottery pairs it is possible to 




The experiment was conducted at the SonderForschungsBereich 504 laboratory at the 
University of Mannheim in May and June of 2009. It was run manually under a single blind 
social distance protocol. The experiment consisted of 13 sessions (with a minimum of 6 
subjects per session) that lasted on average 45-50 minutes including the payment of subjects. 
A total of 184 students of various majors (about half either economics or business), recruited 
from the laboratory subject pool, participated in our three treatments – Baseline, Certain 
Punishment, and Uncertain Punishment. Most of the students had previously participated in 
economics experiments. Each subject only participated in a single session of the study. 
Subjects earned on average 10.56 Euro including a 5 Euro show up fee. 
The sequence of events in a session was the following.  (i) Upon entering the laboratory 
subjects drew a ball from an urn. The number that was indicated on the ball assigned their seat 
for the experiment and thus determined the matching which was done according to a pre-
assigned matching protocol.  (ii) The neutrally framed instructions (in German) for the 
prisoner’s dilemma (and the punishment stage in the two punishment treatments) were handed 
out. All sheets indicated subjects’ ID number.  (iii) The subjects read the instructions and 
afterwards were encouraged to ask questions. The questions were asked and answered 
individually.  (iv) The subjects simultaneously made their decisions for the prisoner’s  
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dilemma game.  (v) The experimenters collected the decisions forms, transferred the decision 
information to their anonymous counterparts’ decision forms and returned them to subjects. 
This prevented the exchange of superfluous information and aided in maintaining the 
anonymity of individual decisions.  (vi) After learning the decision of the paired player the 
subjects made their decisions regarding punishment on a second decision form.  (vii) The 
experimenters collected the decision sheets for prisoner’s dilemma and punishment stages. 
(viii) Then the instructions and decision forms for risk attitude elicitation task were 
handed out, filled out by subjects, and collected by the experimenters, one at a time. Subjects 
were informed beforehand that there would be an additional individual task after the 
prisoner’s dilemma game with punishment (prisoner’s dilemma game in Baseline), but not 
about the nature of this task.  (ix) At the end of the session subjects filled out a questionnaire 
asking for their demand for punishment and demographics.
7  (x) Afterwards all of the subjects 
were paid privately in cash. Each subject received the following amount: an endowment of 5 
Euro plus the earnings in the prisoner’s dilemma minus the punishment minus the punishment 
costs plus a payment for one randomly chosen lottery from the risk attitude elicitation task. 
All uncertainties and lotteries were resolved by flipping a coin/rolling a 10-sided die.
8 
 
2.2 Predictions and Hypotheses 
We start off by formulating a hypothesis regarding the subjects’ behavior in the 
prisoner’s dilemma game with and without punishment. In the classical solution for self-
regarding preferences no punishment will ever be observed because it is costly and players 
will always choose to defect. However, models of other regarding preferences offer a different 
prediction. In the following analysis we rely on the Fehr and Schmidt (1999) model of 
inequality aversion, which has been prominently used in the punishment literature. The model 
predicts that a player whose payoff is lower than that of her counterpart will be willing to 
sacrifice some of her payoff to reduce the disadvantageous inequality. That is, a sufficiently 
inequality-averse cooperator will punish the paired defector if the punishment reduces the 
defector’s payoff more than the cost which the punisher has to bear. Hence, if at least some 
subjects are inequality-averse, adding a punishment stage to the game structure decreases the 
expected payoff that players get from defecting, leading to more cooperation in the Certain 
                                                 
7 Because the decision tasks were relatively simple we opted not to include test questions or examples in the 
instructions in order not to bias the subjects.  Answering the questionnaire was not a requirement for payment. 
8 The coin was flipped publicly by a randomly chosen subject. The die was rolled individually by each subject at 
the time of payment.  
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Punishment and Uncertain Punishment treatments compared to Baseline.
9 However, the Fehr 
and Schmidt model does not allow for a prediction whether we should observe more 
cooperation in Certain Punishment or Uncertain Punishment.  
On the other hand, other effects could partly or fully counteract the lower expected 
payoff. The defection is a dominant strategy, so all cooperation in the one-shot prisoner’s 
dilemma game must stem from other-regarding preferences or intrinsic motivation. The 
introduction of a punishment stage could diminish the weight put on the payoff of the other 
person or crowd out the existing intrinsic motivation, thus potentially leading to lower overall 
cooperation even though the pure monetary benefit of cooperation is relatively higher with 
punishment.
10 
Our main hypothesis relates to subjects’ risk attitudes as predictors of their punishing 
behavior in the face of uncertain outcomes. It assumes that a decision maker’s risk attitude 
extends also over the payoffs of the other person. Such assumption reflects relatively 
plausible behavior: When empathizing with another person, the decision maker might try to 
impose her own preferences and values on that person. For instance, in our case if the 
decision maker is risk-averse, her behavior might also be risk-averse when making a choice 
whether to punish or not if the punishment outcome is uncertain from the perspective of her 
counterpart. Hence, we formulate the null as follows: 
 
H0: Risk-averse subjects punish less in Uncertain Punishment than in Certain 
Punishment.  
 
To see how H0 can be derived from the above assumption and the Fehr and Schmidt 
model, consider the following 2-player example using payoffs from the prisoner’s dilemma 
game. Suppose an inequality-averse subject who cooperated in the prisoner’s dilemma while 
her paired person defected. The subject’s utility function is given by:  
 
] 0 , max[ ] 0 , max[ ) ( j i i i j i i i x x x x x x U − − − − = β α .  
 
                                                 
9 Such prediction is in line with the observed behavior in repeated VCM experiments. 
10 See Frey and Jegen (2001) for a survey on crowding out intrinsic motivation. Alternatively, the punishment 
stage could be seen as a form of control which leads to lower cooperation because subjects dislike being 
controlled as has been observed by Falk and Kosfeld (2006).  
 
9
If there is no punishment, the subject’s payoff is  8 5 i i U α − = . In the Certain Punishment 
treatment the subject can punish and obtain a payoff of  6 4 i i U α − = . Thus, she will prefer to 
punish for values of  5 . 0 > i α . In the Uncertain Punishment treatment she gets a payoff of 
7 4 i i U α − = with probability 1/2 and  5 4 i i U α − = also with probability 1/2, yielding an 
expected utility (assuming risk neutrality) of  6 4 i i U α − = ; the same as in Certain 
Punishment. However, under the assumption that the decision maker’s risk attitude extends 
over the payoffs of the other person, a risk-averse subject will have a lower utility derived 




As our hypothesis is connected to subjects’ risk aversion, we start off by describing the 
distribution of risk attitudes in our sample. The risk attitudes were elicited after the 
punishment decisions had been made (but before the decision of the paired player or the 
punishment outcome were revealed). In this method the risk attitude is determined by the 
number of safe choices made while choosing between a safe and a risky lottery. Never 
choosing the safe lottery corresponds to an extremely risk-loving subject. On the other hand, 
the higher the number of safe choices, the more risk-averse the subject is. The distribution of 
safe choices is shown in Figure 1. The risk neutrality corresponds to choosing the safe lottery 
exactly four times.
11 A Median test confirms that the random allocation of subjects to 
treatments yielded three subject groups which do not differ in their distributions of risk 
attitude (p-value = 0.833). In line with other experiments, our subjects show considerable 
amount of risk aversion, while only few are risk-loving. 
 
 
                                                 
11 Definite statements about the risk attitude are only possible if the choices are monotonically ordered, that is 
when there is one lottery such that the subject always chooses the safe lottery for lower ranked lottery pairs and 
the more risky lottery for higher ranked lottery pairs; 93.5% of our subjects display such monotonic choice 
behavior. In the analysis we use the data on all subjects but control for those whose choices were non-monotonic 
and also for those who chose the dominated safe option in the last row of the risk attitude elicitation task.  
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Figure 1: Distribution of Risk Attitudes 
 
 
Table 2 presents subjects’ behavior in the prisoner’s dilemma game and in the 
punishment stage across treatments. In the Baseline treatment 43.2% of subjects chose to 
cooperate with their partner. The cooperation rate decreases to 32.9% with the introduction of 
certain punishment. However, this decrease is not statistically significant (1-sided Fisher exact 
test p-value = 0.180). If the punishment is uncertain the cooperation rate equals 44.3% which 
is approximately the same as in Baseline (1-sided Fisher exact test p-value = 0.532). 
Similarly, we find no difference in cooperation rates between Certain Punishment and 
Uncertain Punishment at the standard significance level (1-sided Fisher exact test p-value = 
0.112). The results do not change when we perform the tests with risk-averse subjects only. 
Despite a relatively large number of subjects in both punishment treatments (n = 70) we 
observe few instances of punishment: there was only 1 subject who punished in Certain 
Punishment and 8 subjects who punished in Uncertain Punishment. It appears that given the 
cost and effectiveness of punishment, the subjects were unwilling to spend resources to 
decrease the payoff of the other person in a one-shot game because the punishment could not  
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lead to more cooperation in the future. However, at this stage we are not able to provide a 
definitive answer why our subjects did not punish.
12 
 
Table 2: Subjects’ Behavior in the Prisoner’s Dilemma Game and Punishment Stage across Treatments 
    Prisoner’s Dilemma  Punishment Stage 
 #  observations  Cooperate  Defect  Punish 
Baseline  44  19  
43.2% 
25  
56.8%  - 
      
Certain 






      
Uncertain 







To verify the effect of risk aversion on the decision to cooperate, we run a probit 
regression and report the results in Table 3. Certain Punishment and Uncertain Punishment 
are dummy variables for the respective treatments; Risk aversion is a dummy for risk-averse 
subjects; Inconsistent is a dummy which takes on the value of 1 if the subject “jumped” back 
and forth between lotteries in the risk attitude elicitation task; Confused is a dummy which 
takes on the value of 1 if the subject chose the lower paying lottery in the last row of the risk 
attitude elicitation task;
13 Age and Male are the subject’s age and gender as reported in the 
post-experimental questionnaire. The estimated coefficients are presented in the first column: 
Risk aversion as well as all other variables is statistically insignificant, supporting our 
previous finding that risk aversion does not influence subjects’ willingness to cooperate. This 
result is robust to excluding demographic variables (results presented on the right hand side of 
Table 3), representing the risk attitude by the number of safe choices instead of a dummy, 
looking at differences from Certain Punishment or Uncertain Punishment as opposed to 
Baseline, and dropping Inconsistent, Confused, Age, and Male variables from the regression. 
The lack of statistical significance should not be interpreted as evidence against the expected 
payoff hypothesis or the crowding out hypothesis, because it is possible that both effects are 




                                                 
12 It is possible that the observed behavior is driven by the large proportion of business and economics majors in 
our sample. Marwell and Ames (1981), Carter and Irons (1991), Frank, et al. (1993), and Rubinstein (2006) 
show that economics students behave in accordance with the predictions of neoclassical theory. 
13 In total, there are 10 inconsistent subjects (1 in Baseline, 5 in Certain Punishment, and 4 in Uncertain 
Punishment) and 4 confused ones (1 in Baseline and 3 in Uncertain Punishment).  
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Error  Z p  > |z|  Coefficie
nt 
St. 
Error  Z p  > |z| 
Certain 
Punishment  -0.30  0.25  -1.20 0.230 -0.26  0.25  -1.07 0.284 
Uncertain 
Punishment  0.01 0.25 0.05  0.962  0.03 0.25 0.14  0.888 
Risk 
Aversion  -0.21  0.23  -0.92 0.358 -0.16  0.23  -0.73 0.468 
Inconsistent  0.65  0.44  1.47  0.142      
Confused  -0.10  0.71  -0.14  0.892      
Age  -0.0004  0.02  -0.02  0.987      
Male  -0.04  0.20  -0.23  0.822      
Constant  0.01 0.60 0.01  0.992  -0.05 0.25 -0.19  0.848 
Number of observations = 184 
 
Our main hypothesis asserts that risk-averse subjects punish less if the punishment 
outcome is uncertain. At the same time, the punishment decision likely depends on the history 
of play: When making their choice, subjects who cooperated might decide differently from 
those who defected themselves and probably behave differently towards cooperators than 
towards defectors (data presented in Appendix 1). To address this issue we include a dummy 
variable for a subject’s own behavior in the prisoner’s dilemma (OwnPD) and for the 
behavior of his or her counterpart (OtherPD) in another probit model (reported in Table 4) 
exploring the determinants of punishment.
14 While we observe that both one’s own and the 
paired person’s behavior in the prisoner’s dilemma game are important factors of the 
punishment decision, risk aversion, age, and gender come out insignificant. If we exclude 
socio-demographic variables the statistical significance of OwnPD and OtherPD decreases 
(presented on the right hand side of Table 4). As before, the results are robust to including the 
number of safe choices in the regression instead of the risk aversion dummy and also to 




                                                 
14 We dropped Inconsistent variable from the specification because no inconsistent subject punished. 
15 This result is consistent with our finding in a classroom experiment where only several students were 
randomly chosen to be paid. The experiment involved a slightly different setup which allowed for punishment as 
well as for reward (Duersch and Servátka (2007)).  
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Error  Z p  > |z|  Coefficie
nt 
St. 
Error  Z p  > |z| 
Own PD  0.87 0.42 2.07  0.038  0.66 0.38 1.74  0.083 
Other PD  -1.11  0.55  -2.00 0.045 -0.65  0.42  -1.57 0.117 
Risk 
Aversion  -0.49  0.45  -1.11 0.267 -0.30  0.42  -0.72 0.470 
Confused  1.91  0.94  2.03  0.043      
Age  -0.03  0.06  -0.05  0.961      
Male  -0.19  0.41  -0.46  0.647      
Uncertain 
Punishment  0.97 0.51 1.88  0.060  1.03 0.48 2.17  0.030 
Constant  -2.02  1.49  -1.35 0.176 -2.12  0.58  -3.68 0.000 
  Number of observations = 140 
 
Recall that in order to keep our design simple we chose to restrict the punishment to only 
one (expected) option. However, it is possible that some subjects would like to punish more or 
less and thus the size of desired punishment might vary across treatments. In order to get at 
least partially at this issue, in the post-experimental questionnaire we asked our subjects the 
following question:  
 
If you could decide how much to destroy of the other player’s payoff how much would you 
like to destroy?  
 
About 20% of subjects provided a positive number as their answer. The answers do not 
significantly vary between treatments, suggesting that the size of the desired punishment does 
not interact with uncertainty of its outcome. When we treat the subjects’ answers as 
observations, a tobit regression with a lower bound of zero (presented in Appendix 2) shows a 
similar pattern: Risk-averse subjects did not destroy more or less in the Uncertain Punishment 





This paper reports an experiment designed to study the role of risk attitude in punishing 
behavior when the outcome of punishment is uncertain. We assume that if the decision maker 
is risk-averse, her behavior will exhibit risk-aversion also over the payoffs of the person who 
is being punished. We observe a relatively small number of punishment instances in our setup 
and find that including a punishment stage (whether with certain or uncertain outcomes) had 
no significant effect on the cooperation rate in the prisoner’s dilemma game. Moreover, we do 
not find any evidence that risk aversion is a factor when making a decision to punish. 
There are several potential explanations and implications for our findings. We discuss 
three of them which are directly related to our design. The first one is that our assumption 
about risk aversion does not reflect reality. Based on models of conditional other-regarding 
preferences (e.g. Dufwenberg and Kirchsteiger (2004), Falk and Fischbacher (2006), Cox, et 
al. (2007), Cox, et al. (2008)) if the decision maker decides to punish, it can be argued that the 
aim of such action is not to benefit the other person but to hurt him. Therefore, it is possible 
that a risk-averse decision maker does not take into account the uncertainty which only affects 
the punished person. In our setup this might imply that the term describing the other player’s 
payoff enters the utility function of a risk-averse decision maker in a risk-neutral way. The 
second explanation is connected with the use of Holt and Laury's measure of risk attitudes 
which might be not appropriate for punishment decisions such as the one presented in this 
paper. Studies by Isaac and James (2000) and Dave, et al. (2007) point out that different 
methods measuring risk attitudes yield significantly different estimates and a recent paper by 
Deck, et al. (2009) finds that their subjects behave as though Holt and Laury task was an 
investment decision. Therefore, a robustness check of our findings with respect to a different 
risk attitude elicitation method seems warranted. Third, in our experiment the punished person 
always learns that he or she is being punished. It is possible that our results do not directly 
apply to environments in which there is a chance that the punished person does not find out 
about the punishment. 
Finally, the lack of punishment effect on the cooperation rate seems to be at odds with 
the literature on public goods VCM where punishment successfully deters free riding. 
However, because of the obvious differences in designs and cost structures we do not offer an 
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Table 5: Subjects’ Punishment Decisions Based on the History of Play 














Cooperate 1  Cooperate  Defect 4 
Cooperate 1 
Uncertain 







Table 6: Tobit Regression Estimates for Destroy 
Destroyt  Coefficient St.  Error  t p  > |t| 
Own PD  7.28 1.77 4.11  0.000 
Other PD  -6.30 1.95 -3.23  0.001 
Risk aversion  0.25 1.89 0.13  0.896 
Inconsistent  1.78 3.70 0.48  0.630 
Confused  4.74 5.33 0.89  0.375 
Age  -0.22 0.21 -1.02  0.310 
Male  2.38 1.65 1.44  0.152 
Baseline  3.44 2.17 1.59  0.115 
Uncertain Punishment  2.94 1.97 1.49  0.137 
Constant  -5.82 5.78 -1.01  0.315 




Appendix 3. UNCERTAIN PUNISHMENT INSTRUCTIONS 
(Translation from German, for column players. The decision forms were printed on 




No talking: Now that the experiment has begun, we ask that you do not talk or communicate any 
longer with each other. If you have a question after we finish reading the instructions, please 
raise your hand and the experimenter will approach you and answer your question in private. 
 
Monetary payments: The experiment will consist of two stages and will be followed by a 
separate decision problem for which you will get paid as well. The amount of money you 
make will depend on the choices made (as described below). Each participant will receive a 
lump sum payment of 5 Euro. This one-off payment can be used to pay for eventual losses. 
Your earnings will be paid to you in cash individually and privately at the end of the session. 
 
Matching:  During the session you will be matched with another person. However, no 
participant will ever know the identity of the person he or she is matched with. 
 
Roles: In the experiment a "row" player is always randomly matched with a "column" player. 
You are the column player. 
 
INSTRUCTIONS – STAGE 1 
 
Your decision in Stage 1: On the DECISION FORM 1 you will see a payoff table. The row 
player decides between Top and Bottom rows, and the column player decides between the 
Left and Right columns. The intersection of the designated row and column determines which 
part of the payoff matrix is relevant (Top Left, Top Right, Bottom Left, Bottom Right) and 
thus determines the earnings for each person. In each cell, the row player's payoff is shown 
first and the column player’s payoff is shown second. Your payoff is printed in bold. 
After you have made the decision, we will collect the decision forms and inform you about 
the decision of your matched row player. 
 
DECISION FORM – STAGE 1 
 
 Left  Right 
Top $5,  $5  $0, $8 
Bottom $8, $0  $2, $2 
 




INSTRUCTIONS – STAGE 2 
Your Decision in Stage 2: After learning the other player’s decision in Stage 1, you can 
decrease the other player’s payoff with 50% probability by 1 Euro and with 50% probability 
by 3 Euro at the cost of 1 Euro to you. We will flip a coin in front of you to determine the outcome. 
If the heads comes up, the other player’s payoff will decrease by 1 Euro. If the tails comes up, the 
other player’s payoff will decrease by 3 Euro. 
If you decide to decrease the other player’s payoff, you will circle the words “I want to 
decrease the other player’s payoff.” 
If you decide to not change the other player’s payoff, you will circle the words “I do not 
want to change the other player’s payoff.” 
The other player can also decrease your payoff or leave it unchanged. 
 
 
DECISION FORM – STAGE 2 
Do you want to decrease the other player’s payoff by 1 Euro with probability 50% and by 3 
Euros with probability 50% at the cost of 1 Euro to you? Please circle. 
I want to decrease the other player’s payoff.   
OR  




RISK ATTITUDE ELICITATION 
 
The next page shows ten decision questions. Each decision is a paired choice between 
"Option A" and "Option B."  
 
You will make ten choices and record these in the box to the left of the option. That is, if you 
prefer option A to option B, you will mark an X by option A. Only one of the ten decisions 
will be used in the end to determine your earnings for this part of the experiment. 
 
A ten-sided die will be used to determine payoffs; the faces are numbered from 1 to 10 (the 
"0" face of the die will serve as 10.) After you have made all of your choices, you will throw 
this die twice, once to select one of the ten decisions to be used, and a second time to 
determine what your payoff is for the option you chose, A or B, for the particular decision 
selected. Even though you will make ten decisions, only one of these will end up affecting 
your earnings, but you will not know in advance which decision will be used. Obviously, each 
decision has an equal chance of being used in the end. 
 
Now, please look at Decision 1 at the top. Option A pays $2.00 if the throw of the ten sided 
die is 1, and it pays $1.60 if the throw is 2-10. Option B yields $3.85 if the throw of the die is 
1, and it pays $0.10 if the throw is 2-10. The other Decisions are similar, except that as you 
move down the table, the chances of the higher payoff for each option increase. In fact, for 
Decision 10 in the bottom row, the die will not be needed since each option pays the highest 
payoff for sure, so your choice here is between $2.00 Euro or $3.85. 
 
To summarize, you will make ten choices: for each decision row you will have to choose 
between Option A and Option B. You may choose A for some decision rows and B for other 
rows, and you may change your decisions and make them in any order.  
 
When you are finished, we will collect your decision sheet. Again, two persons from the class 
will be randomly selected to receive the monetary payoffs. To determine the payoffs from this 
task you will throw the ten-sided die to select which of the ten Decisions will be used. Then 
you will throw the die again to determine the money earnings for the Option you chose for 
that Decision. If you are selected, earnings (in $) for this choice will be paid to you in cash 
when we finish. 
 
So now please look at the empty boxes on the record sheet. You will have to mark an X in one 
and only one of the boxes in each row, depending whether you prefer option A or option B. 
Then the die throw will determine which of the ten decisions is going to count. We will look 
at the decision that you made for the one that counts, and circle it, before throwing the die 








⁭  2.00€ with probability of 1/10,    
1.60€ with probability of 9/10               OR 
 
⁭  2.00€with probability of 2/10,    1.60€ 
with probability of 8/10               OR  
 
⁭  2.00€ with probability of 3/10,    
1.60€ with probability of 7/10               OR 
 
⁭  2.00€ with probability of 4/10,    
1.60€ with probability of 6/10               OR 
 
⁭  2.00€ with probability of 5/10,    
1.60€ with probability of 5/10               OR 
 
⁭  2.00€ with probability of 6/10,    
1.60€ with probability of 4/10               OR 
 
⁭  2.00€ with probability of 7/10,    
1.60€ with probability of 3/10               OR 
 
⁭  2.00€ with probability of 8/10,    
1.60€ with probability of 2/10               OR 
 
⁭  2.00€ with probability of 9/10,    
1.60€ with probability of 1/10               OR 
 
⁭  2.00€ with probability of 10/10,    







⁭  3.85€ with probability of 1/10,    
0.10€ with probability of 9/10 
 
⁭  3.85€ with probability of 2/10,    
0.10€ with probability of 8/10 
 
⁭  3.85€ with probability of 3/10,    
0.10€ with probability of 7/10 
 
⁭  3.85€ with probability of 4/10,    
0.10€ with probability of 6/10 
 
⁭  3.85€ with probability of 5/10,    
0.10€ with probability of 5/10 
 
⁭  3.85€ with probability of 6/10,    
0.10€ with probability of 4/10 
 
⁭  3.85€ with probability of 7/10,    
0.10€ with probability of 3/10 
 
⁭  3.85€ with probability of 8/10,    
0.10€ with probability of 2/10 
 
⁭  3.85€ with probability of 9/10,    
0.10€ with probability of 1/10 
 
⁭  3.85€ with probability of 10/10,   










Thank you for participating in the experiment. Finally, please answer the following questions. 
Your answers will have no impact on your final payoff.  
 
1.  If you could decide how much to destroy of the other player’s payoff how much would 
you like to destroy?  
 
2.  How much of your own payoff would you be willing to pay for it? 
 
3.  How old are you? 
 
4.  What is your gender? 
 
5.  What is your major? 
 
6.  In which country were you born/raised? 
 